This essay argues that Iraq’s destabilising power-sharing expertise might be prevented in consociational Afghan power-sharing if Western actors apply a mannequin outlined by three interrelated classes from Iraq: the necessity for lodging, comprehensiveness, and dedication in power-sharing. ‘Lodging’ instructs Western actors to determine key political pursuits inside a state and guarantee power-sharing consists of these pursuits. ‘Comprehensiveness’ instructs Western actors to facilitate power-sharing that spans a number of dimensions—not wholly investing in a single—which higher equips power-sharing to accommodate various pursuits. ‘Dedication’ instructs Western actors to uphold the soundness of this power-sharing by policing contributors’ compliance. Every lesson comprising the mannequin identifies an instructive failure of Western actors in Iraq that is still avoidable in Afghanistan: Western actors didn’t accommodate key Iraqi pursuits, like Sunni Arabs and pro-unitary Shia Arabs; this knowledgeable their failure to make sure comprehensiveness, permitting autonomy alone to dominate and destabilise Iraqi power-sharing; and so they dedicated foremost to navy victory, to not policing compliance with particulars of Iraqi power-sharing. This essay contributes to present debates round Iraqi power-sharing by demonstrating how three classes from Western failures in Iraq might be utilized to develop secure Afghan consociationalism.

Structurally, the essay begins by briefly clarifying its consociational strategy and corresponding educational debate, then proceeds in two sections: First, it assesses Iraq’s power-sharing instability to derive the mannequin’s three interrelated classes for Afghanistan; second, these classes are then utilized to Afghanistan and ongoing Doha negotiations, discovering that Western actors can produce secure consociationalism in Afghanistan by studying from these failures in Iraq’s power-sharing expertise.

Outlining the essay’s theoretical strategy clarifies the mannequin’s definition of power-sharing dimensions and introduces central educational debates regarding Iraq’s power-sharing expertise. Consociationalism typifies 4 dimensions of power-sharing: Autonomy, proportionality, grand coalitions, and mutual vetoes. That’s, ‘autonomy’ of territories or cultures, ‘proportionality’ in illustration and state sources, ‘grand coalitions’ together with vital communal segments inside authorities, and ‘mutual vetoes’ permitting these segments to hinder delicate insurance policies.[1] These goal to manage battle in plural societies, like Iraq and Afghanistan, by recognising and managing deep divisions. But, the instability characterising Iraq’s power-sharing expertise provokes debate between consociationalists and ‘integrationists’ regarding whether or not this instability is attributable to the absence or presence respectively of consociational dimensions. Integrationists right here argue consociationalism is ineffective for battle regulation, preferring voluntary minimum-winning coalitions, majoritarian methods, and autonomy decided by administrative practicalities, not cultural divisions—all aiming in the direction of setting up civic nationalism quite than empowering ascriptive identities.[2]

Whereas either side recognise Iraq’s instability, debate seeks to reply whether or not consociationalism was the trigger: For instance, Younis argues Iraq’s consociationalism was complete—offering power-sharing over a number of dimensions—and that its instability demonstrates how consociationalism is ineffective for battle regulation, which might favour an integrationist mannequin for Afghanistan.[3] Contrarily, Ltaif argues Iraq’s instability emerged from incomplete consociationalism—it was insufficiently complete and didn’t accommodate key pursuits like Sunni Arabs.[4] But different lecturers and practitioners pin Iraq’s instability neither to its lodging nor comprehensiveness, however from failures to police compliance with power-sharing, with examples from Kirkuk and the Erbil Settlement—each elevating Western actors’ dedication to power-sharing.[5] Nevertheless, none of those arguments alone supply an entire mannequin guiding Afghanistan’s unsure power-sharing future; quite, every broaches interrelated failures of Western-led battle regulation in Iraq which should now be synthesised to display how related instability might be prevented in Afghan consociational power-sharing. The primary of those classes considerations lodging: Consociational power-sharing requires accommodating key pursuits, however Iraq’s unstable power-sharing didn’t.

Iraq’s lesson on lodging in power-sharing agreements begins with Western planning failures for a post-invasion political settlement: the US didn’t prearrange both an inclusive political settlement or the establishments through which an inclusive settlement is likely to be negotiated. On 16 December 2003, Secretary of Protection Donald Rumsfeld wrote to Vice President Cheney, responding to this very criticism: “With opponents saying we had no ‘plan’, it is necessary that we hold referring to our ‘plan’.”[6] But Rumsfeld’s ‘plan’ in December 2003 merely asserted possession of the US’s advert hoc scramble to assemble a post-invasion Iraq; he didn’t deal with the planning that occurred in Washington since 2001, as a result of these plans have been blundered.[7] Rumsfeld participated in planning for the Iraq Struggle since September 2001, and by early 2002 he was lobbying the Bush administration for a minimalist US occupation of Iraq reflecting ostensibly profitable Afghan regime change.[8] Rumsfeld misplaced to a Division of State (DoS) various involving US-led organisation of a prearranged Iraqi provisional civilian authorities, institutionalising democracy post-haste.[9] The transition’s immediacy was paramount: No plans have been made for accommodating various Iraqi pursuits in a political settlement, having presumed their pursuits could be accommodated by the instantly instated Iraqi provisional authorities, not US companies or navy officers.[10] Nevertheless, by means of 2002 and early 2003, consideration drifted to fight planning whereas peacebuilding plans languished, and when Saddam’s regime collapsed in April 2003, these DoS plans weren’t prepared: no US company was geared up to help a transition till the Coalition Provisional Authority’s (CPA) institution in Might 2003, which then spent 5 additional months scrambling to organise Iraq’s provisional authorities. Not solely have been particulars for an accommodative political settlement absent from US planning, however their planning to develop establishments conducive to lodging was improperly executed, in order that the establishments which could have communicated with Iraqi pursuits to develop nationally acceptable, inclusive power-sharing didn’t exist on the essential second when Saddam’s regime collapsed.

This weak intermission of governance was then joined by a second US failure of lodging, additional condemning Iraqi power-sharing to instability: The Bush administration’s failure to outline limits for de-Baathification and the next underrepresentation of antagonised Sunni Arabs in power-sharing negotiations. Bush resolved to purge Baathist management, but by no means prescribed a restrict.[11] The CPA selected to purge deeply, dismissing 30,000 bureaucrats comprising 4 layers of administration, destroying Baghdad’s governance over Iraq.[12] Subsequently, Iraq’s Baathist navy was disbanded, leaving 400,000 predominantly Sunni-Arab troopers unemployed and disempowered.[13] This vacuum of governance and safety was answered by insurgencies, reflecting how Western-led battle regulation made accommodative power-sharing more and more unlikely: Many Sunni Arabs, antagonised by de-Baathification, perceived the brand new state as exclusionary and illegitimate, expressed violently by means of insurgency after which politically by means of boycotting January 2005’s elections. Sunni Arab turnout reached lows of two% in Sunni-dominated Anbar Province and beneath 20% in different majority-Sunni Arab provinces.[14]

Provoked by a failure to accommodate Iraq’s Sunni Arabs, this boycott is constantly recognized historiographically as a watershed second for Iraq’s unstable power-sharing expertise as a result of the elections decided the stability of voting members for the 2005 constitutional drafting.[15] On Western advisors’ suggestions, the election used one nation-wide constituency and party-list, which was exclusionary as a result of the absence of constituencies meant low Sunni-Arab turnout precipitated overrepresentation amongst high-turnout segments—Kurds and Shia Arabs.[16] Consequently, broadly pro-unitary Sunni Arabs have been insufficiently represented in opposition to Kurdish and Shia Arab pro-federalism pursuits. Fairly than guaranteeing Iraqi power-sharing was negotiated by an inclusive set of elites precisely representing every vital phase, as consociationalism advises, the US was as a substitute preoccupied with insurgency and rushed the CPA, after which the US embassy, in the direction of no matter settlement the January elections may produce, disinterested in whether or not power-sharing accommodated Iraq’s pro-unitary pursuits.[17]

The error of integrationist critiques right here is to misidentify this failure of lodging as useful consociationalism, as Younis does when she argues de-Baathification was a direct product of consociationalist primordialism—that  consociationalism requires Sunni Arabs’ exclusion as a result of their grievances are immutable and can’t be reconciled.[18] But the CPA, chargeable for de-Baathification, was not consociationalist—expressing integrationist views on federalism—and its successors on the US embassy weren’t primordialists, as a substitute striving belatedly and unsuccessfully to fix Sunni illustration after the boycott.[19] Likewise, consociationalist theorists emphasise inclusivity and—as of the Nineties—usually are not primordialists.[20] Fairly, it was Western actors’ failure of lodging, not wholesome consociationalism, that might spawn Iraq’s unstable power-sharing structure: Western actors failed to incorporate vital pro-unitary pursuits within the power-sharing negotiations, opposite to consociationalism, finally producing excessively pro-federalism, non-comprehensive power-sharing chargeable for Iraq’s unstable expertise.

This pro-federalism, non-comprehensive power-sharing was finalised in Iraq’s 2005 Structure, which developed the consociational dimension of autonomy—its federalism—on the expense of complete consociationalism, with destabilising penalties. Kurdish events KDP and PUK collectively pushed for maximalist federalism—their most popular various to then-unrealistic independence.[21] Shia Arab events, regardless of working on a united record, have been extra divided on constitutional questions: SCIRI favoured federalism, hoping to rule an autonomous Shia area, whereas Dawa and the Sadrists favoured unitary rule from Baghdad, acknowledging Kurdish autonomy however opposing additional federalism.[22] Nevertheless, Kurdish and pro-federal Shia pursuits proved too highly effective given their overrepresentation from January’s elections—pro-unitary Shia Arabs alone couldn’t curb the strain for intensive autonomy.[23] The ensuing 2005 Structure established a Kurdish federal area (KRG), ceding all governance competencies besides 9 coverage areas unique to Baghdad, largely inconsequential in addition to overseas coverage.[24] Assembly SCIRI’s ambition, a pathway was offered to kind new federal areas, though Shia Arab voters in subsequent elections as a substitute favoured unitary, pro-centralisation politics, befitting their total majority.[25] Western actors didn’t understand the long-term dangers of allowing a power-sharing settlement that was not complete however as a substitute invested power-sharing nearly completely in a single dimension, autonomy, favouring Kurds and failing to accommodate pro-unitary pursuits. This non-comprehensiveness was solely problematic as a result of previous failure of lodging: the US was enabling a one-dimensional power-sharing settlement unduly skewed in the direction of overrepresented Kurdish and SCIRI pursuits. With out exterior strain to broaden power-sharing, solely the fraction of pro-unitary Shia Arabs remained to demand comprehensiveness, however their beneficial properties have been inadequate to realize stability by means of the inclusion of various pursuits over a number of consociational dimensions.

These remaining dimensions—proportionality, mutual vetoes, and grand coalition—make clear how Western actors’ failure to make sure comprehensiveness contributed to Iraq’s unstable power-sharing expertise. Proportionality throughout the structure was solely partly substantiated as a side-payment for autonomy: The PUK, KDP, and SCIRI supplied concessions on oil possession and revenues—types of proportional financial power-sharing—however Kurdish negotiators have been desperate to alternate some oil for autonomy and federal subsidies.[26] Likewise, the one vetoes serviced Kurdish autonomy: vetoes between the federal layers, the place the KRG held a veto inside its territory over nearly all federal laws.[27] This can be a type of self-rule that’s definitionally not consociational as a result of it’s not mutual.[28] Nor was there any grand coalition within the structure to placate unaccommodated Sunni Arabs freshly dethroned from historic political dominance; there was solely a short lived two-thirds legislative majority for choosing transitional presidents, who appointed the Prime Minister-Designate chargeable for authorities formation, however this lapsed after the transition to a simple-majority run-off.[29] This non-comprehensiveness within the 2005 Structure worsened Iraq’s unstable expertise by producing a political system designed to service a pro-federal clique accommodating Kurdish and a few Shia Arab pursuits on the expense of pro-unitary pursuits in a powerful Baghdad authorities.

Dixon, a critic of consociationalism, was appropriate for various functions when he famous that these provisions don’t deal with all 4 dimensions of consociational power-sharing, and elsewhere the identical remark of incomplete consociationalism has induced the labels “consociationalism ‘mild’” and “casual consociationalism”.[30] The instability of Iraqi power-sharing due to this fact can’t be attributed to the strong presence of consociational power-sharing; quite, instability originated with Western actors’ failure to accommodate Iraqi pursuits, which then precluded the comprehensiveness of power-sharing in these one-sided negotiations. Unsurprisingly, pro-unitary ambitions survived the structure’s ratification: Sunni Arabs participated in subsequent elections and pro-unitary Shia Arab events surged in reputation in opposition to SCIRI, abruptly leaving Iraq with correct illustration of these unaccommodated pursuits against intensive autonomy, pitting this more-representative authorities in opposition to a non-accommodative, non-comprehensive power-sharing structure. The consequence was, and continues to be, a relentless destabilising pressure between Baghdad, Erbil, and their nationwide structure.

But, this destabilising relationship between Baghdad and Erbil shouldn’t be wholly defined by the shortage of lodging and comprehensiveness alone: it additional requires incorporating the mannequin’s third lesson—how the shortage of dedication from Western actors to police compliance with power-sharing ensured no settlement was ever reached for these destabilising disputes. The US was dedicated to navy victory in opposition to insurgents, however this dedication didn’t lengthen to policing power-sharing provisions in an Iraqi state they wished to current internationally as impartial and competent—metrics for profitable liberal peacebuilding.[31] For Washington, Iraqi power-sharing disputes have been for sovereign Iraq to resolve, the destabilising penalties of that are well-illustrated by Kirkuk and the Erbil Settlement. First, Kirkuk is a disputed territory of Iraq, traditionally Kurdish however settled with Arabs throughout Saddam’s regime alongside ethnic cleaning in opposition to Kurds, who presently kind a slim majority.[32] As a delicate, symbolic, and oil-rich problem, a three-stage course of was agreed in transitional laws and the 2005 Structure to achieve a power-sharing settlement for Kirkuk earlier than 2008.[33] This course of concerned milestones like its referendum and deadline that Western actors may have used to police compliance by means of simply noticed implementation.[34] Nevertheless, the US didn’t decide to guaranteeing the method, as a substitute specializing in counter-insurgency, concerned with Kirkuk solely the place it risked upsetting well timed US withdrawal.[35] With out exterior policing, Baghdad and Erbil’s strategy to Kirkuk soured, resembling an interstate dispute quite than home politics. Baghdad, anticipating a referendum to return a majority voting to affix the KRG—and thus retreat below Kurdish autonomy—refused to adjust to the agreed procedures.[36] Erbil, desperate to reclaim historic territory, responded coercively, with Peshmerga occupying Kirkuk in 2014, to which Baghdad replied militarily in 2017, regaining management of Kirkuk.[37] Whether or not a power-sharing settlement would have concerned Kirkuk becoming a member of the KRG or attaining particular autonomy from both the KRG or Baghdad, such cooperative options required exterior policing that by no means materialised as a result of Western actors have been uncommitted to the small print of Iraqi power-sharing. Though motivated each by liberal peacebuilding aversions to interference in Iraq’s home politics and their concentrate on safety points, Western actors’ lack of dedication finally destabilised Iraq’s power-sharing expertise by entrenching hostilities between Baghdad and Erbil, who couldn’t alone resolve this dispute cooperatively.

Equally, inside Baghdad, Western actors’ lack of dedication first enabled a destabilising disaster of presidency formation and subsequently failed to ensure a fragile grand coalition settlement—the 2010 Erbil Settlement—aiming to stabilise Iraqi power-sharing, which required exterior help. Iraq’s prime-ministership was an atypically weak premiership as a result of 2005 Structure’s intensive autonomy.[38] Coming into workplace in 2006, and dissatisfied with the premiership’s weak point, Nouri al-Maliki developed patronage networks inside Iraqi intelligence and safety forces, circumventing chains of command.[39] Western actors, involved with Iraqi navy effectiveness, fuelled this by serving to al-Maliki centralise civilian management of Iraq’s navy inside one advisory place topic to his appointment.[40] Empowered atop this patronage community, al-Maliki signalled he wouldn’t settle for defeat after 2010’s indecisive elections, with events struggling to kind a voluntary minimum-winning coalition. For integrationists like Younis, that is proof that consociationalism is the issue as a result of it recommends parliamentary methods which exacerbate competitors for the premiership in coalition formation.[41] Nevertheless, this misses the significance of comprehensiveness, as a result of the consociational reply to this wrestle was to affix proportional electoral methods with the additional dimension of grand coalitions—formulaically allocating positions quite than haggling round minimum-winning coalitions—which Iraqis sought to realize by means of 2010’s ‘Erbil Settlement’.

Right here al-Maliki retained the premiership in alternate for promising to formulaically distribute government portfolios and committee chairs between parliamentary blocs: a type of consociational grand coalition that might enhance the comprehensiveness of Iraqi power-sharing and curb destabilising crises of presidency formation.[42] But Western actors once more didn’t commit, right here to policing the Erbil Settlement—a problem of Iraqi home politics. Toby Dodge presaged the settlement’s failure for related causes: that it lacked enforceability as a result of Iraqis couldn’t police their very own government and its corrupt navy.[43] Each Kirkuk and the Erbil Settlement display the long-term destabilisation of previous Western failures to supply accommodative, complete power-sharing, worsened by this absence of dedication even to the flawed power-sharing that was produced. At every step, Western actors’ failures in lodging, comprehensiveness, and dedication precipitated the Iraqi expertise of power-sharing to change into characterised by instability. And it’s exactly these three classes which due to this fact present the mannequin for Western-led consociational power-sharing in Afghanistan.

To keep away from replicating Iraq’s instability, Western actors should first apply its lesson on lodging: If Doha’s intra-Afghan negotiations fail to accommodate the breadth of Afghan pursuits, they threat a destabilising first step analogous to alienating and antagonising Iraq’s Sunni Arabs. Particularly, two internally various pursuits threat going unaccommodated in Doha’s negotiations: First, elites in Kabul who usually are not loyal to Afghanistan’s present authorities, and second, native elites constituting the decentralised Taliban insurgency. A threat of destabilising exclusion is already seen in Kabul amidst Doha’s negotiations: On 21 October 2020, a Pashtun Islamist elite in Kabul, the chief of Hezb-e Islami, publicly denounced Doha’s negotiations, explicitly citing their exclusion of many Afghan leaders, himself included.[44] It’s unsurprising that Kabul’s elites are threatened by a power-sharing future—the distribution of workplaces and precious patronage networks will likely be diluted by the Taliban’s inclusion. Islamist teams like Hezb-e Islami will face essentially the most electoral and clientelist competitors from Taliban inclusion in Afghan politics, and their management is signalling a warning acquainted to post-invasion Iraq: a failure to accommodate their pursuits might push them to delegitimise or spoil a power-sharing settlement.[45]

Procedurally, it’s unrealistic that Hezb-e Islami could be seated in Doha at this level, but US mediators nonetheless should sort out these potential spoilers once they come up, working to make sure their pursuits are accommodated in Doha’s remaining settlement regardless of their absence. There’s at the moment no indication of US efforts to accommodate these dissenting Kabul elites; US diplomacy treats Kabul’s Doha delegation as representing Kabul’s pursuits inclusively, but it surely actually represents a mix of Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah’s most popular appointees.[46] Whereas no inhabitants is being near-wholly excluded like Sunni Arabs in Iraq’s 2005 negotiations, the exclusion stays essential as a result of it antagonises political elites related to militias and histories of insurgency: Hezb-e Islami and their Pashtun Islamist base may simply destabilise Afghan power-sharing if they don’t seem to be accommodated.[47] Neither Doha delegation will voluntarily accommodate Hezb-e Islami at their very own expense, simply as no one anticipated Kurds or Shi’ites to charitably accommodate Sunni pursuits in Iraq; in each instances, the duty falls on exterior actors to make sure this foundational stability.

Equally, simply as Doha’s Kabul delegation can’t be anticipated to totally accommodate Kabul’s elite pursuits, so too should Western actors not mistake Doha’s Taliban delegation as wholly consultant of Taliban pursuits throughout Afghanistan: accommodating the Taliban should embrace the so-called ‘Taliban Caravan’, which describes the Taliban insurgency’s diversely motivated and extremely decentralised management.[48] Taliban at Doha lack robust authoritarian management over this insurgency and can’t assure that each one Taliban commanders will abide by Doha’s settlement if these commanders discover additional battle preferable.[49] Three key pursuits within the ‘Taliban Caravan’ embrace: Pakistani-sponsored Taliban, Taliban Islamists, and ‘native’ Taliban.[50] The primary, Pakistani-sponsored Taliban, might be regulated not directly by accommodating Pakistan, whose safety curiosity in stopping stronger Indian-Afghan relations is addressed by guaranteeing Taliban presence in authorities by means of grand coalitions and proportionality as elaborated beneath.[51] Conveniently, for Hezb-e Islami’s pursuits, grand coalition and proportionality additionally supply lodging: proportional electoral methods will allow competitivity regardless of Taliban presence, and grand coalitions will protect their presence in authorities regardless of diluting the Islamist vote.[52]

The second ‘Taliban Caravan’ curiosity, hard-line Islamists, requires delicate dealing with of the ‘Emirate query’ on reconciling concepts of an Islamic Republic and Islamic Emirate, which might be managed consociationally by means of mutual vetoes. The third, ‘native’ Taliban, describes communal powerbrokers who take part within the motion as a result of it supplies primary safety and justice in in any other case self-reliant communities—these pursuits are accommodated by means of autonomy for native, conventional political establishments. Lodging in Afghan power-sharing is due to this fact dependent upon its comprehensiveness: To keep away from the instability of Iraq’s autonomy-centric power-sharing, Afghan power-sharing should deal with every consociational dimension above quite than privileging one phase’s most popular dimension, like Kurdish autonomy. There’s a threat of emulating Iraq’s expertise by once more failing to accommodate pursuits and motivating spoilers. This instability may have emerged from non-comprehensive power-sharing. The important subsequent query, then, is tips on how to design complete consociational power-sharing in Afghanistan given the failures of this course of in Iraq.

Presently, Afghanistan’s structure precludes a consociational grand coalition by means of its integrationist winner-takes-all presidentialism, which has already destabilised Afghan politics with out Taliban participation.[53] Regardless of Afghans being extremely fragmented throughout ethnic and sub-ethnic teams, none of whom kind a majority like Iraq’s Shia Arabs, Western actors within the early 2000s hoped an indivisible presidency would produce robust centralisation and civic nationalism to beat Afghanistan’s traditionally weak central authorities.[54] As an alternative, divisions between these segments, like the massive Tajik minority and Pashtun plurality, have been deepened by exclusionary contest over the presidency—Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah twice introduced the Afghan state to disaster by disputing the prized presidential election outcomes. Their disputes have been managed by US and UN mediation producing advert hoc power-sharing which persists in Abdullah’s position heading the intra-Afghan talks.[55] With majoritarian presidentialism already struggling to outlive Afghanistan’s deep divisions, introducing the Taliban to compete for this unique workplace guarantees a return to violence and highlights the futility of making use of integrationist, majoritarian fashions for Afghanistan—these fashions require a foundation for big-tent, centrist ‘Afghan nationalism’ which doesn’t exist.[56]

As an alternative, semi-presidentialism like Iraq’s would ease post-conflict reconciliation by portioning the presidency into a primary ministership and a strengthened meeting speaker, producing two newly empowered workplaces to accommodate additional pursuits inside management roles. The utility of this grand coalition part was so obvious in Iraq that it emerged informally, an ‘Iraqi Nationwide Pact’ of a Kurdish president, Shia premier, and Sunni speaker; but the casual, unenforceable nature of Iraq’s pact is a weak point that needlessly dangers instability in Afghanistan at any time when one phase seems ready to renege.[57] No matter Doha’s groups may agree for an inclusive distribution of those workplaces, Afghanistan’s grand coalition should assure the Taliban not less than one such management position to accommodate each the Quetta Taliban and their Pakistani allies. Even this primary step in the direction of consociationalism demonstrates why stability requires additional comprehensiveness: How may Afghan semi-presidentialism with grand coalitions perform with out proportionality?

Particularly, proportionality overcomes two obstacles for Afghan grand coalitions: First, guaranteeing that accommodating the Taliban doesn’t itself alienate Kabul’s anxious Islamists like Hezb-e Islami; second, stopping threats of majoritarian domination by one segmental curiosity, which might spoil any intra-Afghan settlement however would require a degree of disproportionality solely conceivable in majoritarian methods. Afghanistan’s legislative elections use the one non-transferable vote (SNTV), a majoritarian system risking excessive disproportionality and wastage in constituencies the place a number of events attraction to the identical voter bases.[58] The Taliban and Hezb-e Islami draw equally on Pashtun, Islamist constituents, and SNTV dangers subsuming Hezb-e Islami beneath Taliban electoral victories.[59] Proportional electoral methods forestall this by aiding the competitivity of area of interest events,  awarding surplus ranked votes and formulaically allocating seats. By negotiating a proportional system at Doha, the Taliban and Pakistan will likely be assured that Pashtun and Islamist voters will likely be precisely represented in authorities, whereas Hezb-e Islami will likely be assured that Taliban competitors doesn’t eclipse them because it may below majoritarianism. Additional, proportionality inside Afghanistan’s a number of stability of energy ensures that no phase will train a majoritarian share in authorities even between events—there isn’t any majority like Iraq’s Shia Arabs which may threaten a majoritarian relapse of the sort Horowitz phrases the ‘degradation downside’, the place a majority phase rallies and legislates an finish to power-sharing.[60]

Grand coalitions and proportionality in Afghanistan will preclude any threat of power-sharing degradation given its ethnic fragmentation. And simply as proportionality facilitates grand coalitions, Iraq’s expertise illustrates how proportionality with out grand coalitions is dysfunctional in post-conflict settings, once more advising complete consociationalism: Iraq’s events have been fragmented by legislated proportionality but wanted to voluntarily kind minimum-winning coalitions amidst uncooked civil-war divisions.[61] The Erbil Settlement sought to affix proportionality with a grand coalition for this very motive throughout 2010’s extended coalition negotiations. To evade Iraq’s expertise, Doha’s settlement should not solely overhaul Afghanistan’s governmental system with a proper grand coalition accommodating pursuits between Kabul, Quetta, and Islamabad, however furthermore should reinforce this dimension with proportionality, collectively warding in opposition to reversion to armed battle from failures to consensually kind minimum-winning coalitions.

But even with a grand coalition and proportionality to accommodate Pakistan, Quetta Taliban, and Kabul Islamists, additional comprehensiveness by means of mutual vetoes is required for the predictable flashpoints inside this grand coalition that additional consists of the various ‘independents’ like Ghani and events like Jamiat-e Islami and Hezb-e Wahdat. Right here, Iraq’s lesson is that vetoes have to be mutual if they’re to advertise stability, not unidirectional and destabilising as from Erbil to Baghdad. Though no single occasion will achieve a majority given proportionality, broader ideological pursuits threaten to win destabilising majorities: Particularly, the ‘Emirate query’ considerations whether or not Afghanistan ought to protect civil liberties and democratic establishments gained since 2002 or introduce Islamist reforms. For Afghan power-sharing stability, either side have to be empowered to guard these delicate political wants. Taliban, for instance, can’t be enabled to rally broader Islamist help past their very own largely Pashtun base to undermine girls’s rights within the 2004 Structure, which they’ve signalled.[62] Inversely, pro-Republic Afghans can’t be allowed to freely trample Islamist wants like spiritual justice or training, but an Afghan Uzbek navy commander not too long ago signalled an eagerness to reply rising Islamism with violent suppression.[63]

The pragmatic resolution is safety by means of mutual vetoes—stopping destabilising, non-cooperative insurance policies on delicate points by requiring consensus. Given Afghanistan’s a number of stability of energy, it may suffice to permit one-third of the meeting to go a movement designating a invoice as a key determination requiring a two-thirds majority, just like a mutual veto mechanism in Northern Irish consociationalism.[64] This threshold approximates current polling the place 25% of Afghans supported transitioning to an Islamic Emirate, however the threshold is negotiable and easily goals to stabilise Kabul’s authorities by means of mutual political safety.[65] Iraq’s dealing with of vetoes was destabilising exactly as a result of it was not mutual: Baghdad was successfully powerless to manipulate the KRG as a result of structure’s provisions on regional laws’s priority, and this one-sidedness knowledgeable the refusal of Baghdad to adjust to provisions treating Kirkuk. Consequently, Western actors should swallow their liberal preferences and push Doha’s negotiations to incorporate mutual vetoes: if vetoes are absent or one-sided as they have been in Iraq, then even mixed proportionality and grand coalitions threat unravelling over delicate coverage wants.

Whereas central authorities pursuits are accommodated by means of these three consociational dimensions, it will be a mistake to imagine that is sufficiently complete for Afghanistan: Autonomy stays essential to accommodate native actors in Afghanistan’s battle—the ‘native Taliban’ of the decentralised insurgency, powerbrokers, and warlords, who all threaten stability if uncared for. Whereas Iraq’s therapy of autonomy emerged from overrepresenting Kurdish and Shia Arab pursuits throughout negotiations, Afghanistan suffers an reverse downside—robust native pursuits exist for autonomy throughout Afghanistan’s rural communities, but little urge for food exists to accommodate these pursuits in Doha’s negotiations, that are primarily involved with energy in Kabul.[66] Autonomy in Afghanistan wouldn’t be federal, however quite includes formalising the casual political establishments already governing Afghanistan’s rural communities since not less than the Nineteen Seventies, surviving a long time of civil warfare and incomes robust legitimacy.[67] An awesome failure of Western-led battle regulation from 2001 was anticipating ‘trickle-down centralism’ to unfold nationwide from a Kabul authorities that was extremely centralised on paper; this undertaking failed, simply because it failed when Abdur Rahman first tried it within the late-nineteenth century, and it at the moment dangers undermining the legitimacy of a power-sharing Kabul.[68] The Taliban’s fast unfold within the Nineties, and once more within the 2000s, was facilitated by these native actors who primarily sought safety and justice from a superior authorities, whether or not Kabul or insurgents, demonstrating these pursuits’ power.[69] For on a regular basis governance, these communities are self-reliant and mistrust Kabul’s bureaucrats: Localities most frequently kind autonomous extra-legal councils staffed variously by elders, maliks, mullahs, or khans relying on the tradition, however in each case dealing with dispute decision and native politics by means of conventional establishments perceived as respectable.[70]

Amidst civil warfare, these communities are more and more militarised, whether or not becoming a member of the Taliban or mobilising in opposition to it. Consequently, many now embrace militia commanders whose cooperation in ‘Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration’ processes is crucial for a profitable Doha ceasefire.[71] Their pursuits have to be accommodated with ensures to protect these establishments through which their social and political capital is invested. This requires Kabul to formalise limitations on its energy over rural communities, which is a concession requiring Western strain with out voices at Doha representing these native pursuits.[72] There’s little instantly analogous between Iraqi and Afghan autonomy given their immensely completely different contexts, but the generalised lesson of Iraq’s expertise stays instructive: comprehensiveness in power-sharing is essential for accommodating the various pursuits inside a polity and thereby avoiding an expertise characterised by instability.

Though Afghan power-sharing’s stability depends upon this laborious lodging of pursuits by means of comprehensiveness, Iraq’s expertise demonstrates how merely agreeing to those phrases is inadequate with out corresponding dedication from exterior actors policing compliance. The US should due to this fact push at Doha for a task as an exterior guarantor of Afghan power-sharing’s implementation, and this dedication should coexist with its February 2020 withdrawal settlement, upon which Taliban participation relies upon.[73] Army withdrawal dangers being interpreted as non-commitment, but it is a second the place US dedication should solely change tracks from navy to political.[74] The failure of US dedication in Iraq earlier than, throughout, and after the 2005 Structure was to minimise Western dedication to Iraqi power-sharing whereas as a substitute specializing in invasion and counter-insurgency. As soon as agreed, Afghan power-sharing have to be carried out and upheld, which requires constitutional amendments, legislative reforms, and elections—fragile processes risking reversion to warfare.[75] With out exterior dedication, Iraq’s expertise showcased elites refusing to implement agreed power-sharing, like Kirkuk and the Erbil Settlement. In Afghanistan, the chance of battle over comparable failures has current precedents within the 2014 and 2019 elections. In these elections, the need of Western dedication was demonstrated by US and UN election monitoring, discovering substantial voter fraud and providing important mediation.[76] This disaster was managed by exterior dedication and from Iraq’s expertise of non-committed exterior actors to think about that subtracting exterior policing whereas including Taliban participation would produce stability. The dedication of exterior actors to policing Doha’s agreements will decide the soundness of any complete, accommodative, consociational power-sharing in Afghanistan by managing these inevitable moments of disaster and dispute.

In conclusion, Western actors should deal with three interrelated elements of power-sharing in Afghanistan to keep away from an unstable expertise: Energy-sharing should embrace various pursuits which can not presently have a voice at Doha but credibly threat destabilising an unaccommodating intra-Afghan settlement; it should obtain this lodging by means of comprehensiveness, broaching all consociational dimensions of power-sharing; and it should obligate dedication from Western actors, primarily the US, to police compliance with this settlement, with out which the chance of disputes and reneging which threaten to spoil peace. Every of those classes is inseparable and collectively kinds an instructive mannequin derived from the failures of battle regulation in Iraq, the place consociational power-sharing was not joined by lodging, comprehensiveness, or dedication, and so produced an Iraqi expertise characterised by instability. By making use of these classes absolutely, an intra-Afghan settlement would lastly be on a meandering highway to secure, consociational power-sharing.

Notes

[1] Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale College Press, 1977), 25–43.

[2] John McGarry, Brendan O’Leary, and Richard Simeon, ‘Integration or Lodging? The Enduring Debate in Battle Regulation’, in Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Lodging?, ed. Sujit Choudhry (Oxford: Oxford College Press, 2008), 45–51; John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, ‘Iraq’s Structure of 2005: Liberal Consociation as Political Prescription’, Worldwide Journal of Constitutional Legislation 5, no. 4 (2007): 670–76.

[3] Nussaibah Younis, ‘Set As much as Fail: Consociational Political Constructions in Publish-Struggle Iraq, 2003–2010’, Up to date Arab Affairs 4, no. 1 (2011): 2.

[4] Eduardo Abu Ltaif, ‘The Limitations of the Consociational Preparations in Iraq’, Ethnopolitics Papers 38, no. 1 (2015): 5–12.

[5] Toby Dodge, ‘Iraq’s Highway Again to Dictatorship’, Survival 54, no. 3 (2012): 150–57; Raad Alkadiri, ‘Federalism and Iraq’s Constitutional Stalemate’, Analysis Paper, Center East and North Africa Program (Chatham Home, 2020), 2, https://www.chathamhouse.org/websites/default/information/2020-11/2020-11-27-iraq-federalism-alkadiri.pdf.pdf.

[6] Donald Rumsfeld, ‘Referring to the “Plan”’, 16 December 2003, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Paperwork/FOID/Special_Collection/Rumsfeld/DocumentsReleased_to_Rumsfeld_Under_FOIA.pdf?ver=2017-05-05-104646-373.

[7] Toby Dodge, ‘Intervention and Desires of Exogenous Statebuilding: The Software of Liberal Peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq’, Assessment of Worldwide Research 39, no. 5 (2013): 1201; Particular Inspector Common for Iraq Reconstruction, Laborious Classes: The Iraqi Reconstruction Expertise (Washington, D.C.: US Authorities Printing Workplace, 2009), 7–28.

[8] Particular Inspector Common for Iraq Reconstruction, Laborious Classes, 7–8.

[9] Particular Inspector Common for Iraq Reconstruction, 8.

[10] Phebe Marr, The Trendy Historical past of Iraq (Boulder: Westview Press, 2012), 260–65; Particular Inspector Common for Iraq Reconstruction, Laborious Classes, 40–41.

[11] Particular Inspector Common for Iraq Reconstruction, Laborious Classes, 73–74.

[12] Jonathan Monten, ‘Intervention and State-Constructing: Comparative Classes from Japan, Iraq, and Afghanistan’, ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 656, no. 1 (2014): 182; Marr, The Trendy Historical past of Iraq, 267–68.

[13] Dodge, ‘Liberal Peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq’, 1206.

[14] Renad Mansour and Faleh Jabar, ‘Inter- and Intra-Ethnic Relations and Energy Sharing in Publish-Battle Iraq’, European Yearbook of Minority Points On-line 11, no. 1 (2014): 192.

[15] Marr, The Trendy Historical past of Iraq, 287–92; Gareth Stansfield, ‘Intervention in Iraq: From Regime Change to de Facto Partition’, in Routledge Handbook of Safety Research: Second Version, ed. Myriam Dunn Cavelty and Thierry Balzacq (New York: Routledge, 2017), 281; Charles Tripp, A Historical past of Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge College Press, 2007), 295–96; Younis, ‘Set As much as Fail’, 12–13.

[16] Particular Inspector Common for Iraq Reconstruction, Laborious Classes, 204; Mansour and Jabar, ‘Energy Sharing in Publish-Battle Iraq’, 191–93.

[17] Paul Bremer, ‘Technique for Iraq’s Political Transition’, 10 November 2003, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Paperwork/FOID/Readingpercent20Room/CPA_ORHA/06-F-2495_doc_1.pdf; Particular Inspector Common for Iraq Reconstruction, Laborious Classes, 205–6.

[18] Younis, ‘Set As much as Fail’, 4 and 9–10.

[19] Coalition Provisional Authority, ‘CPA 0767: Administrator’s Weekly Governance’, 12 March 2004, § 3, https://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Paperwork/FOID/Readingpercent20Room/CPA_ORHA/08-F-1338_CPA_0767_Administratior_weekly_Governance_March-12-2004.pdf; Particular Inspector Common for Iraq Reconstruction, Laborious Classes, 229–31.

[20] Arend Lijphart, ‘Energy-Sharing, Ethnic Agnosticism, and Political Pragmatism’, Transformation 21, no. 1 (1993): 94–96.

[21] Alkadiri, ‘Federalism and Iraq’s Constitutional Stalemate’, 4; Marr, The Trendy Historical past of Iraq, 269–71.

[22] Gareth Stansfield, ‘Accepting Realities in Iraq’, Briefing Paper, Center East Program (Chatham Home, 2007), 6, https://reliefweb.int/websites/reliefweb.int/information/sources/97ACCEBF0B94A5FC492572DF000F82CA-Full_Report.pdf; Alkadiri, ‘Federalism and Iraq’s Constitutional Stalemate’, 4–5; Marr, The Trendy Historical past of Iraq, 293.

[23] Ashley Deeks and Matthew D. Burton, ‘Iraq’s Structure: A Drafting Historical past’, Cornell Worldwide Legislation Journal 40, no. 1 (2007): 63–65.

[24] Represent Venture, ‘Iraq’s Structure of 2005’, 2005, §§110 and 114-15, https://www.constituteproject.org/structure/Iraq_2005.pdf.

[25] Alkadiri, ‘Federalism and Iraq’s Constitutional Stalemate’, 7–8; Dodge, ‘Iraq’s Highway Again to Dictatorship’, 154.

[26] Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 38–39; Deeks and Burton, ‘Iraq’s Structure’, 63–65 and 72–74; Mansour and Jabar, ‘Energy Sharing in Publish-Battle Iraq’, 199.

[27] Represent Venture, ‘Iraq’s Structure of 2005’, §§ 110, 114-15.

[28] Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 37; Matthijs Bogaards, ‘Iraq’s Structure of 2005: The Case In opposition to Consociationalism “Gentle”’, Ethnopolitics, 2019, 6–8.

[29] Represent Venture, ‘Iraq’s Structure of 2005’, §§ 70 and 76.

[30] Paul Dixon, ‘Is Consociational Idea the Reply to International Battle? From the Netherlands to Northern Eire and Iraq’, Political Research Assessment 9, no. 3 (2011): 316–17; Bogaards, ‘Iraq’s Structure of 2005’, 1–2 and eight; Toby Dodge, ‘Iraq’s Casual Consociationalism and Its Issues’, Research in Ethnicity and Nationalism 20, no. 2 (2020): 145–48.

[31] Dodge, ‘Liberal Peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq’, 1206–12.

[32] Liam Anderson, ‘Energy Sharing in Kirkuk: The Want for Compromise’, in Energy Sharing in Deeply Divided Locations, ed. Joanne McEvoy and Brendan O’Leary (Philadelphia: College of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 364.

[33] Represent Venture, ‘Iraq’s Structure of 2005’, § 140; Coalition Provisional Authority, ‘Legislation of Administration for the State of Iraq’, 8 March 2004, § 58, https://net.archive.org/net/20090423064920/http://www.cpa-iraq.org/authorities/TAL.html.

[34] Anderson ‘Energy Sharing in Kirkuk’, 367.

[35] Stefan Wolff, ‘Governing (in) Kirkuk: Resolving the Standing of a Disputed Territory in Publish-American Iraq’, Worldwide Affairs 86, no. 6 (2010): 1372; Anderson, ‘Energy Sharing in Kirkuk’, 367.

[36] Wolff, ‘Governing (in) Kirkuk’, 1369–71.

[37] Alkadiri, ‘Federalism and Iraq’s Constitutional Stalemate’, 10.

[38] Dodge, ‘Iraq’s Highway Again to Dictatorship’, 150–51; Mansour and Jabar, ‘Energy Sharing in Publish-Battle Iraq’, 193–94.

[39] Marr, The Trendy Historical past of Iraq, 320; Dodge, ‘Iraq’s Highway Again to Dictatorship’, 151–53.

[40] Dodge, ‘Iraq’s Highway Again to Dictatorship’, 151–52.

[41] Younis, ‘Set As much as Fail’, 4–6.

[42] UNAMI, trans., ‘Erbil Settlement’, 7 November 2010, https://peacemaker.un.org/websites/peacemaker.un.org/information/IQ_101107_IraqErbilAgreementpercent20percent28Englishpercent29.pdf; Ltaif, ‘The Limitations of the Consociational Preparations in Iraq’, 7 and 13–14.

[43] Dodge, ‘Iraq’s Highway Again to Dictatorship’, 157.

[44] BBC Monitoring, ‘Afghan Politician Decries Doha Peace Talks’, 21 October 2020, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c20242hz.

[45] Joanna Nathan, ‘Studying the Taliban’, in Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Discipline, ed. Antonio Giustozzi (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), 32; Anatol Lieven, ‘The Struggle in Afghanistan: Its Background and Future Prospects: Evaluation’, Battle, Safety & Growth 9, no. 3 (2009): 337–38.

[46] BBC Monitoring, ‘Afghan Reconciliation Council Chief Criticises Appointments’, 1 September 2020, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c201zyqy; US Division of Protection Inspector Common, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: Lead Inspector Common Report back to the USA Congress (Arlington: US Division of Protection, 2020), 10–11.

[47] Particular Inspector Common for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Classes from the U.S. Expertise in Afghanistan (Arlington: SIGAR, 2019), 53–57.

[48] Martine van Bijlert, ‘Unruly Commanders and Violent Energy Struggles: Taliban Networks in Uruzgan’, in Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Discipline, ed. Antonio Giustozzi (London: Hurst & Co., 2009), 160.

[49] Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn, An Enemy We Created: The Fable of Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan (London: Hurst & Co., 2012), 246–47; van Bijlert, ‘Unruly Commanders and Violent Energy Struggles’, 162–66.

[50] van Bijlert, ‘Unruly Commanders and Violent Energy Struggles’, 160–61.

[51] Lieven, ‘The Struggle in Afghanistan’, 343–44; van Linschoten and Kuehn, An Enemy We Created, 243–44.

[52] Particular Inspector Common for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Reintegration of Ex-Combatants, 55.

[53] Represent Venture, ‘Afghanistan’s Structure of 2004’, 2004, §§ 60-4, 71-3, and 90-5, https://www.constituteproject.org/structure/Afghanistan_2004.pdf.

[54] Lieven, ‘The Struggle in Afghanistan’, 339; Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political Historical past (Princeton: Princeton College Press, 2010), 277–78; Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, ‘Casual Federalism: Self-Governance and Energy Sharing in Afghanistan’, Publius: The Journal of Federalism 44, no. 2 (2014): 326–27.

[55] Colin Cookman, ‘Elections as a Disputed Energy-Sharing Mechanism in Afghanistan’, SAIS Assessment of Worldwide Affairs 38, no. 1 (2018): 82–84.

[56] McGarry, O’Leary, and Simeon, ‘Integration or Lodging?’, 70–71; Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political Historical past, 19–21; Lieven, ‘The Struggle in Afghanistan’, 338–40.

[57] Ltaif, ‘The Limitations of the Consociational Preparations in Iraq’, 6–7; Mansour and Jabar, ‘Energy Sharing in Publish-Battle Iraq’, 198–99.

[58] Cookman, ‘Elections as a Disputed Energy-Sharing Mechanism in Afghanistan’, 84–86.

[59] Lieven, ‘The Struggle in Afghanistan’, 338; Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political Historical past, 6–7.

[60] Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, 55–57; Donald L. Horowitz, ‘Ethnic Energy Sharing: Three Huge Issues’, Journal of Democracy 25, no. 2 (2014): 10–11.

[61] Marr, The Trendy Historical past of Iraq, 298–300.

[62] BBC Monitoring, ‘Afghan Peace Talks in Doha’, 11 December 2020, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c2028ka8; Represent Venture, ‘Afghanistan’s Structure of 2004’, §§ 83-4 and 149.

[63] BBC Monitoring, ‘Army Official Seeks Permission to “Suppress” Taliban’, 19 November 2020, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c20242hz.

[64] Northern Eire Workplace, ‘The Belfast Settlement’, 10 April 1998, Strand One, § 5(d), https://property.publishing.service.gov.uk/authorities/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/settlement.pdf.

[65] BBC Monitoring, ‘Survey End result Backs Republic System in Afghanistan’, 21 September 2020, https://monitoring.bbc.co.uk/product/c2021m3r.

[66] Alex Thier, ‘What Are the Prospects for Energy-Sharing within the Afghan Peace Course of?’, United States Institute of Peace, 16 September 2019, https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/09/what-are-prospects-power-sharing-afghan-peace-process; Ulrich Pilster, ‘Afghanistan: Peace by means of Energy-Sharing?’, The Washington Quarterly 43, no. 1 (2020): 137.

[67] Murtazashvili, ‘Casual Federalism’, 324–25.

[68] Christine Noelle-Karimi, ‘Jirga, Shura and Neighborhood Growth Councils’, in Native Politics in Afghanistan: A Century of Intervention within the Social Order, ed. Conrad Schetter (Oxford: Oxford College Press, 2014), 42–43; Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political Historical past, 161–63; Murtazashvili, ‘Casual Federalism’, 327.

[69] Nazif Shahrani, ‘Centre-Periphery Relations in Afghanistan’, in Native Politics in Afghanistan, ed. Schetter, 31–34; Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Native Politics and the Taliban’, in Native Politics in Afghanistan, ed. Schetter, 79–83 and 86–87; Thomas Barfield, ‘Continuities and Modifications in Native Politics in Northern Afghanistan’, in Native Politics in Afghanistan, ed. Schetter, 140.

[70] Giustozzi, ‘Native Politics and the Taliban’, 78–79.

[71] Barfield, ‘Native Politics in Northern Afghanistan’, 138–40; Particular Inspector Common for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Reintegration of Ex-Combatants, 62–64, 84–85, and 94–95; US Division of Protection Inspector Common, Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: Lead Inspector Common Report back to the USA Congress, 13.

[72] Thier, ‘What Are the Prospects for Energy-Sharing within the Afghan Peace Course of?’; Pilster, ‘Afghanistan: Peace by means of Energy-Sharing?’, 136.

[73] Ryan C. van Wie, ‘A Peacekeeping Mission in Afghanistan: Pipedream or Path to Stability?’, Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs 3, no. 4 (2020): 182–84; US Division of State, ‘Settlement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan’, 29 February 2020, 2, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Settlement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf.

[74] van Wie, ‘A Peacekeeping Mission in Afghanistan: Pipedream or Path to Stability?’, 197–98.

[75] Pilster, ‘Afghanistan: Peace by means of Energy-Sharing?’, 136–38; Cookman, ‘Elections as a Disputed Energy-Sharing Mechanism in Afghanistan’, 83–84.

[76] Cookman, ‘Elections as a Disputed Energy-Sharing Mechanism in Afghanistan’, 83–84.

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Written at: King’s School London
Written for: Professor Michael Kerr
Date written: December 2020

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